No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (A Critique and Proposed Alterations) by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.




No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 1970 (A Critique and Proposed Alterations)
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970 (A Critique and Proposed Alterations)" (1970). Minnesota Law Review. 2987.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2987
No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970
[A Critique and Proposed Alterations]
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last year "no-knock" laws-which allow unannounced
forcible entries by police into private homes-have been a sub-
ject of great concern, engendering constitutional debate among
Congressmen1 as well as apprehension among citizens.2
While Ker v. Californias has made it clear that no-knock en-
tries can be constitutional, much ambiguity remains as to the
time and manner in which they may be made. The no-knock pro-
visions of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 19704 attempt to reduce that ambiguity in the
1. E.g., 116 CONG. REc. S. 11,646-66 (daily ed. July 17, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Ervin).
2. E.g., No Knock Drug Bill, Tnds, Feb. 9, 1970, at 11-12; Buckley,
No Knock?, NAnONAL REV., Feb. 24, 1970, at 220; Of Plumbing and Pri-
vacy, EBONY, April, 1970, at 154-55.
3. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-358 (July 29, 1970), 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2509-2743 [hereinafter cited to sections of D.C. CODE (Supp. IV,
1971) ] contains the following no-knock provisions:
SUBCHAPTER VI-AUTHORITY TO BREAK AND ENTER UNDER
CERTAIN CONDITIONS
§ 23-591. Authority to break and enter under certain conditions
(b) Breaking and entry shall not be made until after such officer
or person makes an announcement of his identity and purpose and the
officer reasonably believes that admittance to the dwelling house or other
building or vehicle is being denied or unreasonably delayed.
(c) An announcement of identity and purpose shall not be re-
quired prior to such breaking and entry-
(1) if the warrant expressly authorizes breaking and entry
without such a prior announcement, or
(2) if circumstances known to such officer or person at the
time of breaking and entry, but in the case of the execution of a
warrant, unknown to the applicant when applying for such warrant,
give him probable cause to believe that-
(A) such notice is likely to result in the evidence subject
to seizure being easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of,
(B) such notice is likely to endanger the life or safety of
the officer or another person,
(C) such notice is likely to enable the party to be arrested
to escape, or
(D) such notice would be a useless gesture.
SUBCHAPTER IV-ARREST WARRANT AND SUMMONS
§ 23-561. Issuance form and contents
(b) (1) . . . If the complaint establishes probable cause to believe
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District of Columbia by codifying this area of police procedure.
It is the purpose of this Note to review those provisions and in-
quire whether they are in fact a codification of "existing law,"
as proponents suggested;5 and whether they provide adequate
safeguards for fourth amendment rights.
II. THE NO-KNOCK PROVISIONS
A. THE GENERAL RULE
The provisions lay down a general rule," enumerate certain
exceptions to that rule (the no-knock exceptions) 7 and specify the
procedural contexts in which the exceptions are to operate.8
The general rule is that unannounced forcible entries may
not be made, unless the officer has announced his identity and
purpose and has been denied admittance or admittance has been
unreasonably delayed.9
B. THE EXCEPTIONS
Four basic exceptions to this general rule allow entries with-
out a prior statement of identity and purpose. Prior announce-
that one of the conditions set out in subparagraphs CA) through (D) of
section 23-591 (c) (2) is likely to exist at the time and place at which
such warrant is to be executed, the warrant may contain an authoriza-
tion that it be executed as provided in section 23-591.
SUBCHAPTER H--SEARCH WARRANTS
§ 23-521. Nature and issuance of search warrants
(f) A search warrant shall contain . . . (6) where the judicial
officer has found cause therefore, including one of the grounds set
forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or (D) of section 23-591 (c) (2), an au-
thorization that the executing officer may break and enter the dwelling
house or other building or vehicles to be searched without giving notice
of his identity and purpose....
§ 23-522. Applications for search warranis
(c) The application may also contain . .. (2) A request that the
search warrant authorize the executing officer to break and enter dwell-
ing houses or other buildings or vehicles to be searched without giving
notice of his identity and purpose, upon probable cause to believe that
one of the conditions set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or (D) of sec-
tion 23-591 (c) (2) is likely to exist at the time and place at which such
warrant is to be executed.
5. E.g., 116 CONG. REC. S. 11,684-85 (daily ed. July 17, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Tydings). "The statutory exceptions to the knock-
and-wait rule are strictly limited so as to confine no knocking to those
few circumstances where it is already permitted under existing law."
6. D.C. CODE § 23-591 (b) (Supp. IV, 1971).
7. D.C. CODE § 23-591 Cc) (2) (A)- (D) (Supp. IV, 1971).
8. D.C. CODE §§ 23-591(c) (1)-(2), 23-561(b) (1), 23-521(f) (6),
23-522(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).
9. D.C. CODE § 23-591(b) (Supp. IV, 1971).
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ment is excused where:
.1. such notice is likely to result in the evidence subject to sei-
zure being easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of [the
destruction of evidence exception] ,1o
2.- such notice is likely to endanger the life or safety of the offi-
cer or another person [the peril exception],"
3. such notice is likely to enable the party to be arrested to es-
cape [the escape exception],12 or
4. such notice would be a useless gesture [the useless gesture
exception].13
The exceptions operate in four procedural contexts: no-
knock arrest warrants, no-knock search warrants, ordinary arrest
and search warrants, and arrests and searches without warrants.
1. No-Knock Arrest Warrants
An officer may break a door without prior announcement
to execute an arrest warrant if expressly so authorized in the
warrant.14 An arrest warrant may so authorize if there is prob-
able cause to believe it likely that circumstances at the time and
place of the warrant's execution will be those described in the
destruction of evidence, peril, escape or useless gesture excep-
tions.1r
2. No-Knock Search Warrants
Prior announcement is excused if expressly so authorized in
a search warrant.16 A search warrant may so authorize if there
is probable cause to believe it likely that the circumstances at the
time and place of the warrant's execution will be those described
in the destruction of evidence, peril or useless gesture excep-
tions.17
10. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (A) (Supp. IV, 1971).
11. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (B) (Supp. IV, 1971).
12. D.C. CODE § 23-591 Cc) (2) (C) (Supp. V, 1971).
13. D.C. CODE "§ 23-591 Cc) (2) (D) (Supp. V, 1971).
14. D.C. CODE § 23-591 Cc) (1) (Supp. V, 1971).
15. D.C. CODE § 23-561(b) (1) (Supp. IV, 1971).
16. D.C. CODE § 23-591 Cc) (1) (Supp. V, 1971).
17. D.C. CODE §§ 23-521(f) (6) & 23-522(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).
Note that the circumstances of the escape exception have been elimi-
nated as grounds for issuance of a no-knock search warrant. Presun-
ably, this omission reflects the fact that escapes, while problems in ar-
rest situations, do not arise in search proceedings.
. .. The circumstances of the destruction exception have not, however,
been omitted as grounds for a no-knock arrest warrant This is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the United States Supreme Court's position that
search warrants must be procured whenever reasonably practical.
See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). If it is practical to
1971]
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3. Ordinary Arrest and Search Warrants
An officer executing an ordinary arrest or search warrant
may make a no-knock entry if circumstances at the time he at-
tempts to execute the warrant give him probable cause to believe
that the situation described fits the destruction of evidence, peril,
escape or useless gesture exceptions. 18
The right of an officer to make a no-knock entry to execute
an ordinary warrant is conditioned upon his ignorance of the
circumstances justifying such entry at the time he applied for the
warrant. If he knew of such circumstances he should have ap-
plied for a no-knock warrant, thereby allowing prior judicial re-
view of the mode of entry. This condition is intended to establish
a statutory preference for prior judicial review of no-knock en-
tries 9 paralleling the preference for prior judicial review which
the United States Supreme Court has indicated in regard to ar-
rests and searches generally.20
4. Arrests and Searches Without Warrants
An officer may make a no-knock entry to arrest or search
without a warrant if circumstances at the time of the arrest or
search give him probable cause to believe that the situation
described fits the destruction of evidence, peril, escape or useless
gesture exceptions. 2 1
III. CASE LAW BACKGROUND
Proponents of the District of Columbia bill suggested that
these provisions constitute no material change in the law, but
merely codify existing law.22 A review of the case law back-
procure a no-knock arrest warrant, it is difficult to see why a no-knock
search warrant might not also be procured. Constitutional rights
would thereby be protected by insuring that the judicial review fo-
cuses on the search directly rather than as a mere incidental matter in
an application for an arrest warrant.
18. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).
19. See 116 CONG. REC. S. 11,570-71 (daily ed. July 16, 1970) (re-
marks of Senator Tydings). "The bill requires prior judicial review of
so-called no-knock entries whenever the officer knows in advance he
may have difficulty in executing a search or arrest warrant. The bill
provides that, when an officer knows before hand that his life may be
in danger or that evidence may be destroyed, he must seek specific au-
thorization from a judge before he can enter the premises to be searched
without knocking."
20. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
21. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).
22. See note 5 supra.
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ground of unannounced forcible entries by police in criminal
cases will reveal the extent to which this proposition is true.
A. TBE GENERAL (S &AY,-) RULE
The general rule of the common law first appeared as dicta
in Semayne's Case23 where the court observed,
[i]n all cases when the King is party [Le., criminal cases], the
sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house,
either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.'s proc-
ess, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he
ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request
to open doors .... 24
The Semayne rule has been observed in subsequent English and
American cases. 25
In McLennon v. Richardson 20 the defendant officers forcibly
entered plaintiffs house to quell a breach of the peace without
first demanding admittance. In the ensuing trespass action the
court held that defendant's answer was insufficient because it
failed to allege that a demand for admittance had preceded the
entry. In most English and American cases, however, the neces-
sity of prior announcement to validate the arrest or search ap-
pears only in dicta,27 because in most cases the officers made such
an announcement but were refused admittance. The issue of an
23. 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). The opinion also refers to the
general rule respecting execution of civil process; to wit, that forcible
entries cannot be made, even after a demand and refusal Id. at 198.
24. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
25. The Semayne rule, moreover, is embodied in the statutes of
many states, in two 1961 District of Columbia statutes and in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109 (1969). See Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An
Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. Jom,"s L. Rlv. 626, 654-59 (1970).
26. 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 74 (1860).
27. A typical dictum appears in the English case of Burdett v. Ab-
bot, 104 Eng. Rep. 501 (KB. 1811), where officers executing an arrest
warrant for the offense of libel broke doors after an announcement, a
demand of entry and a refusal of admittance. See also Case of Richard
Curtis, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (KB. 1757); Launock v. Brown, 106 Eng. Rep.
482 (K.B. 1819).
Similar dicta are presented in the American cases of Barnard v.
Bartlett, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 501 (1852), and Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns.
263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). In Barnard the officers broke doors after an
announcement, demand and refusal to execute the criminal arrest
warrant of a Justice of the Peace. See also Jacobs v. Measures, 79
Mass. (13 Gray) 74 (1859); Commonwealth v. McGahey, 77 Mass. (11
Gray) 194 (1858); State v. Shaw, 1 Root. 134 (Conn. 1789). In Bell the
officers, after an announcement, demand and refusal, broke doors to exe-
cute a search warrant. Bell is said to be the earliest American case to
consider the question of forcible entry in the execution of a search
warrant. Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry:




"unannounced" entry therefore rarely is presented by the facts. 28
One case stands in sharp contrast to those above. Its lan-
guage suggests that a prior announcement before breaking is
never necessary to execute criminal process. The court in Hawk-
ins v. Commonwealth29 felt that such formalities "would in many
cases defeat the very object in view, by giving the offender notice
of his danger, and an opportunity of effecting his escape."80
Whether these remarks pertain to an issue presented by the facts
or are merely dicta cannot be determined, as the Kentucky Court
of Appeals presents no statement of facts whatsoever.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE Semayne RULE
Exceptions to the Semayne rule of announcement were not
recognized by early English text writers. East observed that
in every case, whether criminal or civil, where doors may be
broken open in order to make an arrest, there must be a pre-
vious notification of the business and a demand to enter on
the one hand, and a refusal on the other, before the parties pro-
ceed to that extremity.31
American criminal cases, however, have recognized five basic
categories of exceptions:
1. The Destruction of Evidence Exception
Prior announcement is unnecessary where evidence is being
destroyed within. This exception is a recent California "judi-
cial exception, ' 32 in cases where "exigent circumstances" 88 are
present, to one of California's Semayne rule statutes.8 4 Although
some commentators 35 suggest this rule arose in People v. Mad-
28. See generally Blakey, supra note 25, at 500-08; Sonnenreich &
Ebner, supra note 25, at 627-29; Annot., 5 A.L.R. 263 (1919).
29. 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 395 (1854).
30. Id. at 397.
31. 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 324 (1806 ed.). See 1 HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 459 (1778 ed.); 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, c. 14,
s.1 (1762 ed.). The English courts later recognized an exception in a
civil case. In Aga Kurboolie Mahomed v. Queen, 13 Eng. Rep. 293
(P.C. 1843), the court held that where officers, having entered plaintiff's
home through an open door to execute an arrest warrant on civil process
and having been thrown out by plaintiff, forcibly reentered without an-
nouncement, such lack of announcement was permissible because plain-
tiff "full well knew the purpose for which they returned .... " Id. at
296.
32. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963).
33. Id. at 39.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1969).
35. See Blakey, supra note 25, at 515; Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra
note 25, at 631.
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dox,36 the California Supreme Court in People v. Gastello37 indi-
cated that its holding in Maddox was extended to allow unan-
nounced entries to prevent the destruction of evidence only in
later cases38 The Gastello court clarified both the circumstances
in which the destruction of evidence exception is applicable and
the constitutional requirements attending its application. The
officers in that case made a no-knock entry into defendant's
apartment to prevent the destruction of evidence of the narcotics
violations of which defendant was suspected.30 The California
Attorney General argued that a specific showing that destruction
was actually attempted in this particular case was unnecessary.
He sought to justify the entry on the grounds that police experi-
ence suggested that narcotics violators tend to destroy their
easily disposable evidence when confronted by police. In reject-
ing this contention, the court observed that neither it "nor the
United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced forcible
entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on the type of
crime or evidence involved. '40
With respect to the fourth amendment, the court said:
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always
be made to justify any kind of police action tending to disturb
the security of the people in their homes. Unannounced forci-
ble entry is in itself a serious disturbance of that security and
cannot be justified on a blanket basis. Otherwise the consti-
tutional test of reasonableness would turn only on practical ex-
pediency, and the amendment's primary safeguard-the re-
quirement of particularity-would be lost. Just as the police
must have sufficiently particular reason to enter at all, so must
they have some particular reason to enter in the manner
chosen 4 '
The court expressly disapproved of cases in which entries made
to prevent destruction of evidence were justified by the mere
fact that easily destructible evidence was involved. 42
36. 46 Cal 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956). See also notes 53-56 infra.
37. 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967).
38. The Gastello court indicated that only "[1]ater cases have in-
cluded the prevention of destruction of evidence as an additional ground
for noncompliance with section 844. (People v. Covan (1960) 178 Cal.
App. 2d 416,2 Cal. Rptr. 811; People v. Morris (1958) 157 Cal. App. 2d 81,
320 P.2d 67.)" Id. at 587-88, 432 P.2d at 707-08, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
People v. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d 630, 304 P.2d 175 (1956) might also have
been included.
39. The most frequent application of the destruction of evidence
exception has occurred in narcotics cases, because narcotics are easily
destroyed, for instance, by rinsing down a drain or flushing down a toilet.
40. 67 Cal. 2d at 588, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
41. Id. at 588-89, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (emphasis
added).
42. Id. at 589, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
1971]
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The rule of the Gastello court has been strictly adhered to in
subsequent California cases. 43 In People v. Marquez44 the court
held that sufficient particularity was not achieved by (1) the of-
ficer's experience with the propensity of narcotics violators to
flush evidence and (2) information from an informant that this
suspect intended to flush the narcotics if police appeared. Non-
compliance with California's Semayne rule statute45 was there-
fore not permissible.
Similar rules have been established by courts of other juris-
dictions,46 while others appear to sanction the blanket rule which
the Gastello court disapproved.47
2. The Peril Exception
Prior announcement of authority and purpose are unneces-
sary when the life of the officer would be imperiled by such no-
tice. Read v. Case48 has often been cited as the origin of this
exception. 49 In Read a bail sought to arrest his principal, who
took refuge in his house and threatened to resist arrest with a
firearm. The bail gained admittance by subterfuge and opened
the door to police officers who were authorized to arrest the prin-
cipal. The officers entered without prior announcement. The
court stated that
43. Some maintain that in People v. Carrillo, 64 Cal. 2d 387, 412
P.2d 377, 50 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1966), the court "retreated slightly from the
strict position it had assumed in Gastello ... ." Sonnenreich & Ebner,
supra note 25, at 632. This contention is erroneous. The court can hardly
be said to have "retreated" in the 1966 case of Carrillo from the position
it was not to assume until 1967 in Gastello.
44. 273 Cal. App. 2d 341, 77 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1969). See also People v.
De Santiago, 71 Cal. 2d 18, 453 P.2d 353, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1969). Cf.
People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968),
where particularity was required to justify application of the escape
exception.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (1969).
46. See Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States ex. rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1967); State
v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140 (1969); Commonwealth v. New-
man, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968).
47. See Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964). Note
however, that this case was decided before the clarification of the de-
struction of evidence exception in Gastello. See also People v. DeLago,
16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 963 (1966), in which a no-knock warrant was justified by blanket
rules.
48. 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
49. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 54-55 (1963); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306,
294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956).
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[u]nder these circumstances, he [the principal] was not within
the reason and spirit of the rule requiring notice; nor was the
bail obliged by law to make a demand, that would probably
issue in the destruction of his life.50
The officers' entry was justified because they were assistants of
the bail. The court in People v. Smith5 ' found the peril excep-
tion applicable where an officer made an unannounced entry into
the apartment of a defendant who was reported over police radio
to have just shot and killed two policemen.
3. The Escape Exception
Prior announcement is not necessary when an escape is being
attempted by the party to be arrested. The escape exception,
like the destruction of evidence exception, arose in California
as a judicial exception to California's Semayne rule statute52
where exigent circumstances are present.53  In People v. Mad-
dox 54 officers making an arrest without a warrant on suspicion of
narcotics violations knocked on defendant's door. Hearing a male
voice say "wait a minute" and retreating footsteps, they broke in
the doors without further announcement and arrested the de-
fendant. The court held the entry lawful, observing that
since the demand and explanation requirements of section 844
are a codification of the common law, they may reasonably be
interpreted as limited by the common law rules that compli-
ance is not required if the officer's peril would have been in-
creased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded entrance and
stated his purpose.55
The court cited Read v. Case and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 206,
comment d as authority for this proposition. While Read does
stand for the peril exception, 56 the "or the arrest frustrated" lan-
guage is derived solely from the rather loose phraseology of the
reporter's comment d to section 206. The court concluded that
because of the "wait a minute" and the retreating footsteps, the
officers' belief that their peril would have been increased or that
the defendant would escape was reasonable. Noncompliance with
the Seymane statute was therefore said to have been permissible.
50. 4 Conn. at 170.
51. 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966). See also
People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1969).
53. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 27 (1963).
54. 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
55. Id. at 306, 294 P.2d at 9. The court in People v. Gastello sub-
sequently stated that this was the holding of Maddox. People v. Gas-
tello, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967).
56. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
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Noncompliance was not excused in the later case of People v.
Rosales,57 where defendant was arrested as a parole violator.
The court found that the facts were insufficient to warrant ap-
plication of the escape exception since the officers were already
stationed at defendant's front and back door, precluding the pos-
sibility of an escape. The court also noted that the officers were
in visual contact with the defendant and saw no suspicious move-
ments suggesting an imminent escape attempt.
The Rosales court emphasized the Gastello viewpoint re-
specting particularity,58 noting that a belief that an escape would
be attempted "cannot be justified by a general assumption that
certain classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely than
others to resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence." 9
4. The Useless Gesture Exception
Prior announcement is unnecessary when the officer's pres-
ence, authority and purpose are already known to those within.
Although this exception has been articulated in a number of
ways-useless gesture, senseless ceremony, fresh pursuit-its
common feature in most cases is that those within are already
aware of the officer's presence, authority and purpose. The court
in Allen v. Martin0 held that it would be a "senseless cere-
mony""' to make an announcement where an officer in "pursuit"
of an escaped arrestee breaks a door to retake him. In Miller v.
United States6 2 the United States Supreme Court said,
[i]t may be that, without an express announcement of purpose,
the facts known to officers would justify them in being virtu-
ally certain that the petitioner already knows their purpose so
that an announcement would be a useless gesture.63
The court in Hiller v. State64 held that where officers approach-
ing the premises to execute a search warrant saw a woman (de-
fendant's wife) appear at and then disappear from the door, for-
mal announcement was not necessary. Her behavior in those
circumstances indicated an awareness of the officers' identity
and purpose and implied a refusal of admittance.
57. 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
58. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
59. 68 Cal. 2d at 305, 437 P.2d at 493, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
60. 10 Wend. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
61. Id. at 303.
62. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
63. Id. at 310. See Wittner v. United States, 406 F.2d 1165 (5th
Cir. 1969).
64. 190 Wis. 369, 208 N.W. 260 (1926). Cf. Lehrer v. State, 183
Wis. 339, 197 N.W. 729 (1924).
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One court applied the useless gesture exception in circum-
stances where the defendant was unaware of the presence of
officers. In Bosely v. United States"5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit permitted an un-
announced, non-forcible entry through an open door after offi-
cers had seen the defendant sleeping within and were unable to
wake him by knocking. The court found that "[s]ince appellant
had not been awakened by their knocking, the officers could
reasonably have concluded that further knocking or verbal an-
nouncement would be a 'useless gesture."'0 0 No case authority
is cited for this extension of the useless gesture exception al-
though extensive authority is cited for the proposition that it
had theretofore been applied only where those within already
knew of the officer's presence, authority and purpose.
5. The Unoccupied Premises Exception
Prior announcement is unnecessary in the execution of a
search warrant if the premises to be searched are unoccupied.
This exception has been recognized in cases interpreting Semayne
rule statutes. In Jones v. State 7 the court indicated that strict
compliance with such a statute is not necessary when executing
a search warrant for illegal alcoholic beverages where the prem-
ises to be searched are unoccupied. Dicta in Goodman v. State,8
where the legality of a search to seize betting paraphenalia was
tested, indicates that a demand before breaking doors is neces-
sary only where some person is found in charge of the buildings
to be searched.
C. Summy
The case law respecting unannounced forcible entries by po-
lice in criminal cases can be summarized as follows:
The General (Semayne) Rule: Unannounced entries can
never be made. Doors can be broken only after a prior an-
nouncement of authority and purpose and a refusal of admit-
tance. 6
9
65. 426 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
66. Id. at 1263.
67. 4 Ala. App. 159, 58 So. 1011 (1912).
68. 178 Md. 1, 8, 11 A.2d 635, 638-39 (1940). Accord, Henson v.
State, 236 Md. 518, 522, 204 A.2d 516, 519 (1964). See also People v.
Johnson, 231 N.Y.S.2d 689 (G.S. 1962); Collins v. State, 184 Tenn.
356, 199 S.W.2d 96 (1947). For cases dealing with "temporarily unoc-
cupied" buildings see Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1952).
69. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
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Exceptions to the Semayne Rule: Prior announcement is
excused where:
1) evidence is being destroyed within,'7 0
2) the life of the officer would be imperiled by such notice,7 '
3) the party sought is attempting an escape,72
4) the officer's presence, authority and purpose are already
known to those within,73 or
5) in the execution of a search warrant, the premises to be
searched are unoccupied.74
IV. NO-KNOCK AND THE CONSTITUTION
Although state and lower federal courts have passed upon
the constitutional problems attending no-knock entries," they
have received little attention from the United States Supreme
Court. While it has often decided issues of statutory construc-
tion in no-knock cases,7 6 Ker v. California77 is the only case in
which the constitutional dimensions of no-knock were directly at
issue.
In Ker the officers had probable cause to believe that de-
fendant possessed illegal narcotics. While they were following
him by car he made a sudden U-turn. Having lost contact with
defendant, the officers found his apartment by tracing his auto
license number. Proceeding without a warrant, they obtained
a passkey from the manager and entered defendant's apartment
quietly, making no demand of admittance or notification of au-
thority and purpose before entering. Inside they seized evidence
of narcotics violations lying in plain sight. The California Dis-
trict Court of Appeals held that the entry came within the de-
struction of evidence exception to California's Semayne rule stat-
ute 78 and that therefore the entry was legal and the evidence ad-
70. See text accompanying notes 32-47 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 60-66 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
75. See, e.g., Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1967);
State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140 (1969).
76. The most conspicuous example of such cases is Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). Even though it was decided under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109, some maintain that it is of "constitutional status." Broeder,
Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L.
REV. 483, 505-06. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) and
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) for other cases under
18 U.S.C. § 3109.
77. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1969).
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missible.79 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, five to
four.
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, 0 held that the easily
destructible evidence and defendant's furtive conduct prior to
arrest (the U-turn) indicating that he was expecting police,
were sufficient to bring the entry within the destruction of evi-
dence exception to the Semayne rule statute. Rejecting peti-
tioner's constitutional argument, he held that in the
particular circumstances of this case the officers' method of en-
try, sanctioned by the law of California, was not unreasonable
under the standards of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.8 1
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion8 2 said that even though
there was probable cause to arrest, the arrests were nevertheless
illegal because. the unannounced entry in these circumstances
violated the fourth amendment . 3 While Justice Clark was brief
in his treatment of the no-knock issue, Justice Brennan embarked
upon an extensive review of unannounced entries, and examined
the history of the Semayne rule, its exceptions and the constitu-
tional issues which no-knock presents.8 4 Justice Brennan took
the restrictive approach that all exceptions but the peril exception
must be predicated upon an awareness of the officer's presence s 5
This narrow position is further demonstrated by his enumeration
of exceptions to the Semayne rule. He would find a fourth
amendment violation except
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' au-
thority and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in
the belief that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily
harm, or (3) where those within, made aware of the presence
of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a
knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies
the officers in the belief that an escape or the destruction of
evidence is being attempted.80
Although Justice Brennan noted these exceptions, he afforded ex-
tensive treatment only to the destruction of evidence exception.
This is unfortunate because questions concerning his other ex-
ceptions might have been resolved by fuller discussion. His peril
79. 195 Cal. App. 2d 246, 15 CaL Rptr. 767 (1961).
80. Justices Black, Stewart, and White concurred in this opinion.
Justice Harlan concurred only in its result.
81. 374 U.S. at 40-41.
82. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas and Justice Goldberg
concurred in the dissenting opinion.
83. 374 U.S. at 46-47.
84. Id. at 47-64
85. Id. at 55.
86. Id. at 47.
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exception, in applying only where the persons within are in peril
and not where the officers themselves are in peril, is clearly dif-
ferent from the Read peril exception. 7 Moreover, Justice Bren-
nan does not mention the escape exception, although this is some-
what understandable because Ker was decided before the Gastello
court's clarification of that exception. 8
In demonstrating why he felt that the majority's application
of the destruction of evidence exception is erroneous Justice Bren-
nan gives that exception full exposition. He finds the exception
inapplicable here because the "minimal conditions" for its applica-
tion, "activity within the apartment" 89 which justifies the offi-
cers in the belief that destruction of evidence was being at-
tempted, are absent. Justice Brennan notes that grounds for its
application are not established by general police experience that
narcotics suspects frequently destroy evidence when confronted
by police.90 Such a
subjective judgement of the police officers cannot constitu-
tionally be a substitute for what has always been a necessarily
objective inquiry, namely, whether circumstances exist in the
particular case which allow an unannounced police entry.9 '
The consequence of Ker is that while several issues respect-
ing no-knock entries are clearly settled, only general constitu-
tional principles are available to resolve others. It is, for ex-
ample, settled that "the rule of announcement is a constitutional
requirement implicit in the fourth amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures."9 2 Also appa-rently
settled is a constitutional exception to the rule of announcement
where the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Both
Justices Clark and Brennan admitted the existence of the excep-
tion but disagreed as to whether the Ker facts warranted its ap-
plication. Justice Clark found that the defendant possessed easily
destructible evidence and that his conduct (the U-turn) indicating
that he was expecting police was sufficient. 9' Justice Brennan,
87. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
88. See text in note 55 supra. The complete omission of the escape
exception is strange because Justice Brennan did mention it in the
Court's opinion in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
89. 374 U.S. at 61.
90. Id. at 63.
91. Id. at 63. Note the "particularity" theme which was later
given great emphasis by the Gastello court. See text accompanying notes
37-42 supra.
92. Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Con-
stitutional Problem, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 626, 643 (1970). See also
Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v.
United States, and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 499, 507 (1964).
93. Justice Clark may in effect be saying that the facts here estab-
lish grounds for the useless gesture exception, which facts, when taken
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on the other hand, found such facts insufficient because they did
not indicate "activity within" the apartment which suggested
that destruction was actually being attempted.
More extensive or precise guidelines unfortunately are not
presented by Justice Clark, but the Brennan opinion indicates cer-
tain principles which suggest constitutional guidelines for the
other exceptions. Similar principles have been enunciated by the
Supreme Court of California in Gastello and Rosales.94 These
principles find their origin in the fourth amendment. That
amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures, 95 but
allows, conversely, those which are reasonable. The test of rea-
sonableness is satisfied by a showing of probable cause. 'Probable
cause," in the many contexts in which it operates, is said to exist
when facts and circumstances of the particular case are suffi-
cient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the
intrusion-e.g., an arrest without warrant,90 a search without
warrant,9 7 a "stop and frisk"9 s8-is, under the particular circum-
stances, appropriate. 99 "Mere suspicion"1 00 is insufficient to es-
tablish probable cause; specific facts of the particular case must
justify the intrusion.
Justice Brennan and the Gasteflo court, in essence, require a
showing of "probable cause" to justify a no-knock entry under the
destruction of evidence exception. That is, they require that a
showing of specific facts and circumstances of the particular case
justifies a no-knock entry and denied that a "blanket rule" based
on a category of crime or type of evidence is such a justifica-
tion.1 0 ' While both spoke only to the destruction of evidence
exception, the constitutional requirement of probable cause
should be applicable to all the no-knock exceptions. Indeed, the
with the presence of easily destructible evidence, provide grounds for the
destruction of evidence exception. Justice Brennan's allusion to a "'fresh
pursuit' exception which... Justice Clark apparently seeks to invoke
." 374 U.S. at 60, seems to pick up this theme. Justice Brennan, how-
ever, felt that grounds for such a fresh pursuit exception were lacking
because the facts were insufficient to show that defendant knew the po-
lice were about to visit him.
94. See text accompanying notes 40-44 & 56-58 supra.
95. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
96. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
97. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
98. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
99. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
100. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
101. See text accompanying notes 40-44, 57-59 & 90-91 supra.
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California Supreme Court in People v. Rosales'0 2 suggested
this in indicating that application of the peril, escape and destruc-
tion of evidence exceptions "must be based on the facts of the
particular case."'10 3 Therefore, specific facts (such as the "wait a
minute" and retreating footsteps in Maddox'0 4 ) must justify the
officers in their belief that an escape is being attempted. Simi-
larly, specific facts (for instance, that the defendant had just
killed two policemen as in People v. Smith'0 5 ) must justify the
officers in their belief that prior announcement would imperil
them. Presumably, specific facts must also justify the officers in
their belief that the occupants "already know" of their authority
and purpose, thereby rendering an announcement a "useless ges-
ture."
V. CRITIQUE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PROVISIONS
A. PROPOSED ALTERATIONS
Congress clearly intended that the no-knock provisions be a
codification of the already existing law'0 and that they contain
sufficient safeguards for constitutional rights. 01 The case law
background and constitutional requirements respecting no-knock
entries suggest that the provisions of the District of Columbia
Act partially achieve both goals. Certain alterations, how-
ever, would promote greater understanding of when no-knock
entries may be made and would reduce the chance of unconsti-
tutional application of the provisions. 0
1. Probable Cause Requirement
Congress clearly recognized that an unannounced entry must
be justified by probable cause because a showing of "probable
cause" appears as operative language in the provisions for all
four procedural contexts. 10 9 However, the frequent use of the
102. 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
103. Id. at 305, 437 P.2d at 493, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
104. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
105. 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966).
106. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S. 11,684-85 (daily ed. July 17, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Tydings); H.R. REP. No. 1,303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
236 (1970).
107. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S. 11,570-71 (daily ed. July 16, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Tydings).
108. An amended version is submitted in the Appendix.
109. See notes 5, 15, 17 and 18 supra. Note that while probable
cause is in all cases required there appears to have been some disagree-
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words "is likely to" 10 greatly weakens this requirement. For in-
stance, joining the clauses pertaining to no-knock entries without
warrant with the clause pertaining to the destruction of evidence
exception indicates that "probable cause to believe that . ..,1
such notice is likely to result in the evidence subject to seizure
being easily and quickly destroyed .. ,1112 constitutes justifica-
tion for the entry. Another instance appears where the stand-
ards for issuance of a no-knock arrest warrant are joined with
the destruction of evidence exception to yield a two-fold dilution
of probable cause. It appears that the bill's probable cause re-
quirement for the issuance of a no-knock arrest warrant 1 3 will
be satisfied if it can be shown before a magistrate that a situation
in which "notice is likely to result in the evidence subject to sei-
zure being easily and quickly destroyed ..."4 "is likely to
exist at the time and place at which such warrant is to be exe-
cuted ... "111i s sufficient for issuance of a no-knock arrest
warrant.
Probable cause is satisfied by facts sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a certain
state of affairs exists, not that it is "likely to exist" or "likely
to be likely to exist." It is submitted, therefore, that the words
"is likely to" be deleted in all instances and in lieu thereof the
word "will" be inserted, so that the requirement of probable
cause be unambiguous.
2. Grounds for Warrant Issuance
The section dealing with "nature and issuance of search war-
rants" provides that a search warrant may contain a no-knock au-
thorization "where the judicial officer has found cause therefor,
including the grounds set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(D) of section 23-591(c) (2) . . ."116 The section dealing with
ment between the House and Senate respecting the kinds of facts which
would establish it. The language of the provisions was a compromise;
the issues of detail in dispute are left for the courts to resolve. See
116 CONG. REc. S. 11,853 (daily ed. July 21, 1970) (remarks of Senator
Tydings and excerpt from the Senate Conference Report).
110. See D.C. Code §§ 23-591(c) (2) (A)-(C), 23-522(c) (2) & 23-561
(b) (1) (Supp. IV, 1971).
111. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971) (emphasis added).
112. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (A) (Supp. IV, 1971) (emphasis
added).
113. D.C. CODE § 23-561(b) (1) (Supp. IV, 1971).
114. D.C. CODE § 23-591(c) (2) (A) (Supp. IV, 1971) (emphasis
added).
115. D.C. CODE § 23-561(b) (1) (Supp. IV, 1971) (emphasis added).
116. D.C. CODE § 23-521(f) (6) (Supp. IV, 1971) (emphasis added).
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application for such warrants requires a showing of probable
cause to believe that the conditions described in paragraphs (A),
(B) or (D) will exist when the warrant is executed. 117 This dis-
crepancy should be eliminated by rewording the former section
to read "where the judicial officer has found probable cause to
believe that one of the conditions set out in subparagraph (A),
(B), (D) or (E)"s of section 23-591(c)(2) will exist at the time
and place at which such warrant is to be executed." Such a
change would clarify the necessity of probable cause and would
also remove any ambiguity as to grounds for issuance of the war-
rant.
3. Alterations in Exceptions
Alterations in the phraseology of the destruction of evidence,
escape and useless gesture exceptions would more closely con-
form them to existing law and would, in addition, provide more
adequate safeguards against unconstitutional application. In ad-
dition, the suggested revised wording more aptly describes the
circumstances in which the exceptions can be applied, to the aid
of policemen and magistrates whose understanding of the pro-
vision is essential to their effective yet temperate implementa-
tion.
a. The Destruction of Evidence Exception
The present wording-"being easily and quickly de-
stroyed""9-suggests that a mere showing that easily destructible
evidence is involved will be sufficient grounds for application of
the exception. This is not the better view manifested by
the California Supreme Court 120 and Justice Brennan's dissent in
Ker.12 1 Ease of destruction, while a necessary fact, is not suffi-
cient in itself. Other facts and circumstances must be present-
for instance, shouts, noises from within, retreating footsteps, be-
havior indicating an awareness of police (such as the U-turn in
Ker)-to indicate that destruction is in fact being attempted. It
is submitted that this exception should read where "the destruc-
tion of evidence subject to seizure is being attempted within."
This wording more clearly indicates that an attempted destruc-
117. D.C. CODE § 23-522(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).
118. The presence of exception (E) corresponds to the suggestion for
its inclusion. See text accompanying note 129 infra.
119. D.C. CODE § 23-591 (c) (2) (A) (Supp. IV, 1971).
120. See text accompanying notes 40-44 & 57-59 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
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tion of evidence and not mere destructibility of evidence is re-
quired.
b. The Escape Exception
The circumstances in which this exception has been applied
in the cases would be more clearly reflected by changing its pres-
ent wording--"such notice is likely to enable the party to be ar-
rested to escape . . ."12--to "an escape is being attempted by
the party to be arrested." In Maddox123 a voice saying "wait a
minute" coupled with retreating footsteps was sufficient to jus-
tify the unannounced entry. In Rosales,124 on the other hand, the
entry was unjustified where the facts did not indicate that the
defendant was contemplating an escape. The recommended
change in wording better indicates that the eminence of an at-
tempt to escape puts this exception into operation and more ade-
quately suggests the particular nature of the facts which must
be shown to satisfy the requirement of probable cause.
c. The Useless Gesture Exception
The present wording--"such notice would be a useless ges-
ture"125-gives no hint of the circumstances where this excep-
tion may be applied. The case law background of this excep-
tion12 6 indicates that it is based upon the occupant "already
knowing" of the officer's presence, authority and purpose, in
which event an announcement would be a "useless gesture" or
"senseless ceremony." It appears, however, that Congress also in-
tended to adopt the Bosely v. United States12 7 extension of the
useless gesture exception. 28 In Bosely the officers were unable
to make defendant aware of their presence because he was asleep
and could not be awakened by their knocking. It is suggested
that the wording be changed so as to reflect the factual circum-
stances in which the useless gesture exception is intended to be
applicable. The addition to the act of the words "because the
officer's presence, authority and purpose are already known to
those within or because the officer is unable to make those within
aware of his presence" would accomplish this result.
122. D.C. CoDE § 23-591(c) (2) (C) (Supp. IV, 1971).
123. 46 CaL. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
124. 68 Cal 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
125. D.C. CoDE § 23-591(c) (2) (D) (Supp. V, 1971).
126. See text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
127. 426 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
128. See H.R. REP. No. 1,303, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 237 (1970).
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d. The Unoccupied Premises Exception
Since Congress presumably intended to codify all existing
law respecting exceptions to the rule of announcement, no reason
is apparent for the omission of the unoccupied premises excep-
tion. 129 It is therefore suggested that this exception be included
to permit officers executing a search warrant to forego prior an-
nouncement where the premises to be searched are unoccupied.
4. Post Entry Announcement Provision
To bring the District of Columbia Act closer to the spirit of
the fourth amendment and the policies of the case law which
Congress intended to codify, a clause should be added which
would require an officer who has made a no-knock entry to iden-
tify himself and state his purpose as soon as practical. 180
B. PROVISIONS RETAINED
No change in the present peril exception'3 l appears neces-
sary, because it is a fair statement of the case law exception'8 2
that announcement is unnecessary when the life of the officer
would be imperiled by such notice. The District of Columbia
provision also allows the exception to be applied when the life of
"another person" would be imperiled. This "person" is presum-
ably the one "aiding an officer" in making an arrest or executing
a search warrant, to whom reference is made in other parts of the
provisions. 33
The District of Columbia Act's general rule of announce-
ment 34 is a close paraphrase of the Semayne rule'3" and many
state Semayne rule statutes. 36 No change in wording appears
necessary. The words "unreasonably delayed" should present a
question of fact in each case where unreasonable delay is as-
serted. An unreasonable delay in the form of "silence" after an
announcement has been considered equivalent to a refusal of ad-
129. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
130. See Appendix, § 23-591. This provision is adopted from S. 3246
(The Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of 1970) which passed the
Senate January 28, 1970. See 116 CONG. REC. S. 813 (daily ed. Jan. 28,
1970) for this provision as it passed the Senate.
131. D.C. CODE § 23-591 (c) (2) (B) (Supp. IV, 1971).
132. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
133. See D.C. CODE §§ 23-591 (a) & 23-591 (c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).
134. D.C. CODE § 23-591(b) (Supp. IV, 1971).
135. See 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1693).
136. See Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged
Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 626, 654-59 (1970).
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mittance. 37
No suggestion is made that the provisions for no-knock war-
rants be eliminated, although Senate opponents of the bill firmly
maintained that these warrants will result in an unconstitutional
broadening of the escape and destruction of evidence exceptions.
The basic thrust of their argument was the circumstances
which ordinarily allow application of the escape and destruction
of evidence exceptions-for instance, noises or shouts from within
an apartment, retreating footsteps, behavior indicating an aware-
ness of police-can be known only by the officer at the scene.
They are therefore unknown at the time of application for a war-
rant, and consequently are not susceptible of prior judicial re-
view. The danger of permitting prior judicial review and issu-
ance of no-knock warrants is that in the necessary absence of such
facts the magistrate will rely on "blanket rules" based on cate-
gories of crime or types of evidence (e.g., narcotics), against
which the Gastello court and Justice Brennan in Ker cautioned.
Once a warrant is issued, they argued, the magistrate may have
sanctioned a search that proves to be unconstitutional. Therefore
the practical effect of allowing no-knock warrants may be that the
grounds for no-knock entries will be unconstitutionally broad-
ened from "specific facts" to "blanket rules."1 38
While this argument is of some force, it fails to acknowledge
that specific facts can sometimes be available for prior judi-
cial review. With respect to the destruction of evidence ex-
ception, for instance, a justification might be based on specific
facts indicating that this particular suspect designedly keeps nar-
cotics in a place where he can quickly destroy them (such as a
bathroom). In a case raising the escape exception, justification
could be based on a showing that the place where the suspect is
to be arrested affords him a unique opportunity to escape-for
instance, a house that has exits which cannot be guarded.
Since showing of specific facts and circumstances can be
made to a magistrate, the retention of the no-knock warrant pro-
visions seems the better approach. The benefits of prior judi-
cial review can thereby be realized in at least some cases. Abuse
of the warrant provisions can best be avoided by making clear to
magistrates the kinds of specific facts and circumstances neces-
sary to justify a no-knock entry. Emphasis of the requirement
137. See Morales v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 96, 170 N.W.2d 684 (1969).
138. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S. 11,646-66 (daily ed. July 17, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Ervin); 116 CONG. REc. S. 11,844-45 (daily ed. July
21, 1970) (remarks of Senator McGovern).
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of probable cause and reference to the case law of unannounced
police entries provide the necessary guidelines in this respect.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note consists of an examination of (1) whether the no-
knock provisions of the District of Columbia Act are an accurate
codification of the case law and (2) whether they adequately
safeguard fourth amendment rights. The answer to the second
inquiry is affirmative, because the provisions require a showing
of probable cause to justify a no-knock entry in all instances.
The answer to the first inquiry is substantially affirmative, al-
though certain revisions are recommended. The Appendix con-
tains a revised version of the no-knock provisions of the District
of Columbia Act, which suggests changes in phraseology. These
changes more clearly describe the factual circumstances consti-
tutionally necessary before the no-knock exceptions are appli-
cable. An additional exception and a new clause of general ap-
plication are also suggested.
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APPENDIX
The no-knock provisions of the District of Columbia Court Re-
form and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (proposed alterations
appear in italics):
SUBCHAPTER VI-AUTHORITY TO BREAK AND
ENTER UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
§'23-591. Authority to break and enter under certain conditions
(b) Breaking and entry shall not be made until after such
officer or person makes an announcement of his identity and
purpose and the officer reasonably believes that admittance to
the dwelling house or other building or vehicle is being denied
or unreasonably delayed.
(c) An announcement of identity and purpose shall not be
required prior to such breaking and entry-
, (1) if the warrant expressly authorizes breaking and
entry without such a prior announcement, or
(2) if circumstances known to such officer or person at
the time of breaking and entry, but, in the case of the execution of
a warrant, unknown to the applicant when applying for such
warrant, give him probable cause to believe that-
(A) The destruction of evidence subject to seizure
is being attempted within,
(B) such notice will endanger the life or safety of
the officer or another person,
(C) an escape is being attempted by the party to be
arrested,
(D) such notice would be a useless gesture because
the officer's presence, authority and purpose are already
known to those within or because the officer is unable
to make those within aware of his presence, or
(E) in the case of the execution of a search warrant,
that the premises to be searched are unoccupied.
Provided, that after an entry without prior announce-
ment of identity and purpose, the officer shall, as soon as
practical thereafter, identify himself and give the reasons
and authority for his entrance upon the premises.
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SUBCHAPTER IV-ARREST WARRANT AND SUMMONS
S 23-561. Issuance, form, and contents
(b) (1) . .. If the complaint establishes probable cause to
believe that one of the conditions set out in subparagraphs (A)
through (D) of section 23-591(c)(2) will exist at the time and
place at which such warrant is to be executed, the warrant may
contain an authorization that it be executed as provided in sec-
tion 23-591.
SUBCHAPTER II-SEARCH WARRANTS
§ 23-521. Nature and issuance of search warrants
(f) A search warrant shall contain...
(6) where the judicial officer has found probable cause to
believe that one of the conditions set out in subparagraph (A),
(B), (D) or (E) of section 23-591(c) (2) will exist at the time and
place at which such warrant is to be executed, an authorization
that the executing officer may break and enter the dwelling
house or other building or vehicles to be searched without giving
notice of his identity and purpose ....
§ 23-522. Applications for search warrants
(c) The application may also contain.
(2) A request that the search warrant authorize the ex-
ecuting officer to break and enter dwelling houses or other build-
ings or vehicles to be searched without giving notice of his identi-
ty and purpose, upon probable cause to believe that one of the con-
ditions set out in subparagraph (A), (B), (D) or (E) of section
23-591 (c) (2) will exist at the time and place at which such war-
rant is to be executed.
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